Against truth-conditional theories of meaning : three lessons from the language(s) of fiction. by Uckelman,  Sara L. & Chan,  Phoebe
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
23 July 2015
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Uckelman, Sara L. and Chan, Phoebe (2016) 'Against truth-conditional theories of meaning : three lessons
from the language(s) of ﬁction.', Res philosophica., 2 (93). pp. 1-19.
Further information on publisher's website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2016.2.93.4
Publisher's copyright statement:
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
Against Truth-Conditional Theories of Meaning: 
Three Lessons from the Language(s) of Fiction 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Fictional discourse and fictional languages provide useful test cases for theories of meaning. In this 
paper, we argue against truth-conditional accounts of meaning on the basis of problems posed by 
language(s) of fiction.  It is well-known how fictional discourse — discourse about non-existent objects 
— poses a problem for truth-conditional theories of meaning. Less well-considered, however, are the 
problems posed by fictional languages, which can be created to either be meaningful or not to be 
meaningful; both of these ultimately also provide problems for a truth-conditional account of meaning, 
because it cannot account for the ways in which we use and evaluate such fictional languages.  Instead, 
a pragmatic or use-based account provides a better explanation for some of the phenomena we dicsuss. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The value of a philosophical theory is measured by how well it accounts for edge cases, the tricky 
problems at the limits of the scope. It is one thing to be able to provide a grounded account of central, 
uncontroversial phenomena — for example, what the meaning of a simple declarative English sentence 
such as “Snow is white” is, and how we know this meaning — and yet another thing completely to be 
able to account for the slippery, problematic sentences that cannot be analysed in a straightforward 
fashion. It may be easy to give an account of simple declarative sentences which are grammatically 
correct and whose terms refer to existing, uncontroversial objects, and yet still stumble at the hurdle of 
giving an account of the meaningfulness (or non-meaningfulness!) of the non-simple, the non-
declarative, the non-grammatically-correct utterances, and the sentences which have non-referring 
terms. Many theories of meaning which are able to account for the straightforward cases give results 
which are counter-intuitive in the problematic cases. Now, counter-intuitive results alone are not 
sufficient grounds for rejecting a particular philosophical theory, since in many cases our naïve pre-
theoretic intuitions are misguided or simply wrong, but when faced with a large body of 
phenomenological evidence that is contradicted by theoretical conclusions, we are entitled to ask the 
philosophical theory to explain why there is this discrepancy and where it comes from. That is, it is not 
enough to provide a set of normative principles to guide one’s behavior, it is also licit to ask for an 
explanation of why these principles are so often violated. 
 For theories of meaning, fiction, and in particular fictional language(s), provide excellent edge 
cases against which a theory of meaning can be evaluated and perhaps re-evaluated. In this paper, we 
investigate language(s) of fiction and what they can tell us about the range of possible values a theory 
of meaning can take. Our ultimate conclusion is that these cases provide us with strong reason to reject 
truth-conditional theories of meaning as being inadequate to explain the phenomena, and that use-
conditional or pragmatic accounts may be better suited, at least in some cases. We will argue for this 
conclusion by considering three cases: the language of fiction
1
; fictional languages (that is, non-natural 
                                                 
1  That is, ordinary, every day natural language used in the context of fiction, understood as a 
literary genre. (That the boundaries of this genre may perhaps not be crisply defined [10] does not harm 
our present approach: For our purposes, it is more important that the distinction between what Crane 
calls ‘error’ discourse and ‘fiction’ discourse [5, p. 15] can be made. Both types of discourse involve 
non-referring terms, or fictional/non-existent objects, but are distinguished by our epistemic attitudes 
towards these terms or objects: When we discuss fiction, we know that what we are talking about is 
languages that have been developed in the context of the development of a fictional world) that are 
intended to be meaningful; and fictional languages that are not intended to be meaningful. Each of 
these highlights different ways in which standard truth-conditional accounts of meaning fall short. We 
begin in the next section by re-capping the central points of truth-conditional theories of meaning, and 
how it is problematic to account for the meaning of fictional discourse on such theories; this challenge 
to truth-conditional theories has been well-discussed in previous literature and do not spend much time 
on it, instead focusing on the cases of fictional languages, meaningful (§3) and not (§4). After 
presenting negative evidence against truth-conditional accounts of meaning, in §5 we determine the 
necessary components of a theory of meaning in order for it to be adequate to the phenomena we’ve 
identified. We conclude in §6. 
 
2 The problem of fictional discourse 
 
In order to show how fictional language(s) cause challenges for truth-conditional theories of meaning, 
we first make precise the general criteria that such theories subscribe to. A standard minimal argument 
for a truth-conditional theory of meaning goes something like this:
2
 
 
1. A sentence’s meaning along with the totality of all the facts determines the truth value of that 
sentence. 
2. A sentence’s meaning is at least a function from possible worlds to truth values. 
3. Such a function is a truth condition.
3
 
4. Therefore, a sentence’s meaning is at least a truth condition. 
 
An argument of this type is ontological in nature: It talks about what meanings are, or what they have 
to be at the very least. Such arguments have parallel epistemic arguments, which make claims about 
our access to these ontological features:
4
 
 
1. If you know a sentence’s meaning and the totality of all the facts, then you know the truth 
value of that sentence. 
2. Knowing a sentence’s meaning is at least knowing enough to assign a truth value given the 
totality of all the facts. 
3. To know enough to assign a truth value given the totality of all the facts is to know a truth-
condition. 
4. Therefore, knowing a sentence’s meaning is at least knowing its truth condition. 
 
Epistemic versions are liable to a fairly straightforward objection, in that often we appear to know the 
meaning of a sentence without knowing its truth conditions, and hence knowledge of meaning cannot 
be the same as knowledge of truth conditions (cf. [25]). However, these replies are often question-
begging, for they do not grant the proponent of a truth-conditional account the option of replying 
skeptically, that such arguments show by reductio that in fact, we often may think that we know the 
meaning of a sentence when in fact we don’t. Nevertheless, because ontological versions of the theory 
are better able to withstand potential objections, we will give them priority over epistemic versions. 
 The problem of fictional discourse—how to assign meaning to or evaluate the truth-values or 
                                                                                                                                                                       
not, strictly speaking, true.) 
2  This version is adapted from [18, p. 101]. 
3  Leaving aside problematic cases such as the Liar Paradox. 
4  Also adapted from [18, p. 101]. 
truth-conditions of sentences containing non-referring terms—has a long history.5 Frege famously 
argued that sentences with non-referring names have no truth value. This conclusion follows from his 
adoption of the principle of compositionality and his thesis that the reference of an indicative sentence 
is its truth-value [9, pp. 202–03]. If the reference of a sentence, its truth value, is a function of the 
references of its parts, then if one of its parts has no reference, the whole itself can have no reference 
either. Thus, while “in listening to an epic, for example, we are fascinated by the euphony of the 
language and also by the sense of the sentences and the images and emotions evoked” [9, p. 203], when 
we utter a sentence such as “Odysseus’s wife is Penelope”, we cannot be interested in the truth-value of 
that sentence: Beyond the artistic and poetic properties and effects it might have, the sentence can have 
no further interest “as soon as we recognize that one of its parts is lacking a nominatum” [9, p. 202]. 
Thus: 
 
Sherlock Holmes lives on Baker Street. (1) 
 
is, since it has a non-referring term in it, neither true nor false. Thus, a consequence of adopting a 
Fregean account of fictional discourse is the admittance of truth value gaps. 
 An alternative account of the truth values of sentences with non-referring terms can be adopted 
if one adopts a correspondence theory of truth; then, sentences like (1) turn out to be simply false, 
rather than neither true nor false, because there is no fact in the actual world which (1) could 
correspond to. But this route comes with its own difficulties; we might be happy to say that (1) is false, 
but contrast this with: 
 
Sherlock Holmes is a better detective than Sir Ian Blair. (2) 
 
Like (1), (2) also has a non-referring term in it. And yet, it seems wrong to say that (2) is false; but 
further than that, there is a problem with how to account for the negation of (2). There are two 
possibilities for: 
 
Sherlock Holmes is not a a better detective than Sir Ian Blair. (3) 
 
One option would be to say that (3) is true, since it is the negation of (2). But then we are forced into 
maintaining that the truth values of these two sentences are in fact the precise opposite of what we 
might have thought in our pre-theoretic state. The other option would be to say that (3) is false, since it 
also contains a non-referring term; in that case, one would have to either give up the principle of non-
contradiction for sentences with non-referring terms, or to admit truth-value gluts, and say that (3) is 
both true and false. In the end, neither of these options is terribly palatable. 
  Crane offers an alternative: That fictional statements do have facts in the world that they 
correspond to, they just aren’t the sort that you might expect on a naïve view. They are not facts about 
objects, but rather facts about properties. Following McGinn, he distinguishes properties into those 
which are ‘representation-dependent’ and those which are not. A property is representation-dependent if 
it depends “upon the fact that the object is being represented in some way: in thought, language, 
pictures, and so on” [5, p. 68]. Examples of such properties include “being a mythical horse” or “being 
a fictional character”.  All properties of non-existent objects, with the exception of the property of non-
existence itself, are, he argues, representation-dependent [5, p. 68]. Because such properties depend on 
the existence of a particular representation, e.g., in Greek mythology, in 19th C literature, in a painting, 
                                                 
5  We do not give the history in detail here, but rather sketch some of the relevant points along the 
way. For a full account, see [5]. 
 
etc., there are facts in the world which can be used to ground the correspondence necessary in order to 
obtain truth. That is, truths about Pegasus can be rewritten to be truths about horses (ordinary non-
fictional items), winged items (likewise), and being born from the blood of Medusa (which property 
itself involves reference to a fictional object and so is apt to be re-written into representational 
dependent terms).  But while this may seem like a promising route to take, in the next section we show 
that it cannot adequately account for the phenomena of meaningful fictional languages. 
 
3 Meaningful fictional languages 
 
In this section, we consider the case of meaningful fictional languages—that is, languages which are 
neither natural languages nor formal languages, but rather have been developed by a single person or a 
single small group of people in a context closely related to some fictional genre, and which were 
developed (either from the outset or after a definitive turning point) with the intent that they be 
meaningful.
6
 By comparing and contrasting them with natural (i.e., non-created) languages, we will 
provide evidence for treating these languages as meaningful, and thus that we must give an account of 
how they are meaningful. 
 Our focus in this section are the languages invented by J.R.R. Tolkien, Quenya, Sindaran, and 
Adûnaic, though we appeal to those languages as typifying a relevant phenomenon, rather than as sole 
exemplars. Tolkien’s invented languages are well-known for the attention to detail and realistic 
grammatical and phonological structures that they have, and as a result they are unlike many other 
fictional languages which are made up in a piecemeal fashion without any attempt at a systematic 
foundation underpinning them, or any attempt to make them mirror non-fictional languages in structure 
or complexity. The level of sophistication which these languages bear has the consequence that these 
languages are treated as potential objects of serious study; in fact, one thing that is remarkable about 
Tolkien’s constructed fictional languages is the level and amount of academic scholarship that they 
have generated. The Elvish Linguistic Fellowship (a special interest group of the Mythopoeic Society, 
devoted to the scholarly study of the invented languages of J.R.R. Tolkien), publishes two print 
journals, Vinyar Tengwar and Parma Eldalamberon, and an online journal, Tengwestë; and the journal 
Tolkien Studies, while not specifically devoted to his constructed languages, publishes articles on them, 
such as [12]. 
 Tolkien’s languages can be contrasted with natural languages such as English and Welsh 
because of their origins as developed by a single person rather than as part of a linguistic community. 
Quenya, Sindaran, and Adûnaic, as a constructed rather than natural languages, each had a definitive 
moment of creation or inception. Even though each of these languages evolved as they were developed, 
this development was still governed by the arbitration of a single person. Now that that person is dead, 
that standard of arbitration is gone: There are questions concerning the vocabulary, grammar, and 
pronunciation of Adûnaic, for example, that are left essentially unanswerable. Natural languages such 
as English and Welsh, on the other hand, did not have their birth at the hands of a single person, and as 
a result, it can be argued that there is a normative standard that can be appealed to.
7
 No one single 
person has the authority to say what is meaningful and correct and what is not, and yet these questions 
can still be answered, unlike the case of Tolkien’s languages. 
                                                 
6  In terms of content and the arguments we’ll make, we could in much of what follows also 
discuss constructed non-fictional languages, such as Esperanto.  However, in order to keep the focus 
narrow, we do not do so in the present paper. 
7  What this standard is will differ according to your views concerning the ontology of natural 
languages; it could be the sum of its uses during a particular period, the intersection of all the idiolects 
within a certain range of similarity, or the proclamations of some canonical language academy, as is the 
case with, e.g., French. 
 One might be tempted to use this contrast between Tolkien’s constructed languages and natural 
languages as reason for excluding the former from the scope of a theory of meaning, and say that 
fictional languages are simply not the sort of phenomena that an ordinary theory of meaning is intended 
to account for. But making this move on the basis of the existence of this contrast would be too swift.  
For despite the fact that Tolkien’s languages can be contrasted with natural languages when compared 
on this dimension, on another dimension it is possible for them to be grouped with languages like 
Welsh and English as being meaningful in opposition to other natural languages whose meaningfulness 
can be doubted. 
 Let us consider the issue of translation and how it is connected to meaningfulness. It is possible 
to translate Adûnaic and Welsh, for example, into meaningful English sentences which can be 
understood even by people who perhaps could not understand the untranslated quotes. In this respect, 
then, we might wish to group Adûnaic with non-constructed, natural languages as being ‘meaningful’, 
because translateable.  But not all natural languages are meaningful on this account.  Take, for example, 
Linear A, one of the last remaining undeciphered writing systems of ancient Greece.
8
 Linear A 
inscriptions occur in two contexts: About two-thirds are inscriptions on clay tablets which represent 
accounts lists of goods and commodities and their values, while the other one-third are inscriptions on 
movable objects, usually of votive origin [4, p. 144–145].  The meaning of only a handful of words has 
been established [4, p. 147], and these words are all isolated and independent, meaning that no more 
complex phrases can be deciphered.  As a result, there is no way to translate from the language of 
Linear A
9
 into any other language, as there is no one left alive who understands the language.  Given 
these circumstances, it is unclear what the status of the meaningfulness of Linear A is.  There are two 
different conclusions that could be argued for:  (1) It could be argued that it is meaningful, even in the 
absence of anyone who can understand that meaning, and thus meaning is something which is intrinsic 
to a language itself, and not dependent on the people who use the language.  Alternatively, (2) it could 
be argued that Linear A, given that there is no one presently who can decipher it, is currently 
meaningless. If it were to be deciphered in the future, then it would become meaningful again, but there 
would then be a period in between in which it was not meaningful.  Such an option would deny that 
meaning is inherent in a language in isolation, but is only present in a language in use.  While we do 
not adjudicate this issue here, it should be clear by the end of this paper that an account of meaning 
which is at least partially grounded in pragmatics would provide a way for an option of type (2) to be 
realized.  We do not decide the issue here because we need not: It is sufficient for our purposes that 
there be natural languages whose meaningfulness can be questioned.  As a result, we cannot simply  
discriminate between natural languages and constructed, fictional languages and say that the former are 
meaningful and the latter are not on the basis of this distinction alone. 
 
 We now look at the corpora of these languages, which themselves cause problems for applying 
standard theories of meaning – even theories of meaning in fictional contexts – to them. Adûnaic is 
distinguished from the more well-known Tolkienian languages of Quenya and Sindarin by the paucity 
of examples that we have in it (the most full account of it occurs in [26]). As Fauskanger notes, “There 
are no coherent Adûnaic texts. Except single words scattered around in Lowdham’s Report, most of the 
corpus consists of a number of fragmentary sentences given in SD:247, with Lowdham’s interlinear 
translation” [8]. In contrast, there exist relatively large bodies of text in Quenya and Sindarin, not only 
those composed by Tolkien himself in the original context of development and construction — that is, 
internal to his mythology — but also texts written in a context external to the mythology, for example, 
                                                 
8  Linguists are generally agreed that Linear A is a script encoding a natural language, though an 
alternative explanation is offered in passing at [4, p. 143]. 
9  There is uncertainty whether the script in both contexts represents the same underlying 
language. 
the post-Tolkien Quenya original compositions by Velasco and Bican, and Fauskanger’s translation into 
Quenya of parts of Genesis, Luke, and John.
10
 Even in external contexts, it is clear that the content 
which is expressed in the majority of these texts
11
 is intended to be fictional. The extant fragments are 
not intended to be read literally as expressing statements about the actual world: Almost no one writes 
lesson plans in Quenya, composes a shopping list in Adûnaic, or submits meeting minutes in Sindarin.  
Even if one wanted to, the circumscribed nature of the vocabulary in these languages provides a 
significant barrier.
12
 
 Thus, the majority of the data that we have in these languages is fictional in nature, which 
returns us to the problem we encountered in the previous section, of how to ascribe meaning to fictional 
discourse. When we consider natural languages, the corpora that we have include both fictional and 
non-fictional discourse, and by adopting a strategy like Crane’s, we can use our non-fictional discourse 
to ground our fictional discourse, by reducing the fictional content to representation-dependent content, 
and these representations are meaningful because they are being used outside of a fictional discourse 
context. If, however, we try to give a similar story for fictional, as opposed to natural, languages, then 
we are stymied by the fact that it is unclear how to make the move from discourse about non-existent  
objects to discourse about representation-dependent properties within the constraints of that fictional 
languages. If these languages are only ever used in fictional contexts, then the languages may simply 
not have sufficient expressivity for such a reduction. Representation-dependent properties are, after all, 
dependent upon the particular mode of representation, and thus we can distinguish between 
representation-dependent properties which depend upon a mode of presentation in English and 
representation-dependent properties which depend upon a mode of presentation in Adûnaic.  We may 
be able to sufficiently describe the island of Anadûnê in English to know that it is an Adûnaic 
translation of Quenya “Númenor”; but this one might argue that this makes “Anadûnê” a meaningful 
word in English, not one in Adûnaic.  On Crane’s account, in order for “Anadûnê” to be meaningful in 
Adûnaic, we would need to be able to reduce “Anadûnê” to a collection of Adûnaic-representation-
dependent properties.  The problem is that Adûnaic clearly does not have the vocabulary necessary to 
perform such a reduction and yet, the word is clearly meaningful in Adûnaic, not just in English.  It 
must be the case that words in Adûnaic are meaningful in that language before we can perform any sort 
of translations from Adûnaic into English.  The fact that not only did Tolkien (via the character 
Lowdham) provided translations from Adûnaic into English but also because it is possible to augment 
and correct Lowdham’s translations via other information that Tolkien provided about the language in 
other contexts shows that Adûnaic’s meaningfulness is prior to the representation of its nonexistant 
objects via English-representation-dependent properties.  The evaluation of translations as better or 
worse is not the only way that we treat these languages as meaningful; scholars also engage in literary 
criticism (cf. the above mentioned journals), and practitioners, despite the paucity of examples in the 
original context of the language, are able to develop and generate new examples, such as original 
poetry written in Adûnaic found at [8]. Thus, if we consider our behavior with respect to these 
languages, we treat them as if they are meaningful, and this activity must be accounted for and 
explained. 
 Of course, it is always possible to stick to one’s philosophical guns, and take the stance that we 
are mistaken when we think we know what the sentences mean.  But this is a rather sharp horn on 
which to impale oneself, because it doesn’t provide any account for our behavior with respect to these 
sentences. One might alternatively adopt an epistemic rather than ontological truth-conditional account 
                                                 
10 All of these are available from Fauskanger’s website “Ardalambion”, http://folk.uib.no/hnohf/, 
accessed 26 Feb 15. 
11  Leaving aside the Biblical translations. 
12  Note that this is the case even if we allow for the coinage of new words on the basis of the morphological 
principles that Tolkien has detailed; the original linguistic stock is too impoverished to construct all the words necessary. 
of meaning, and say that there are truth conditions governing sentences in these languages, we merely 
do not know them, and hence we do not know the meaning of these sentences (even though they would 
on this account be meaningful). But this sceptical position also does not adequately take into account 
our behavior. There is clearly some factor that guides our behavior — there must be something in 
which referees evaluating prospective articles for Tengwestië ground their reports. If this is not the 
meaning of the sentences, then whatever it is, it certainly seems to be something which is functionally 
equivalent to meaning. 
 
4 Nonsense languages 
 
The languages we saw in the previous section were marked out by the level of sophistication in their 
creation; this sophistication is part of what allows for behavior with respect to these languages that put 
pressure on us to say that what is expressed by these languages is meaningful. If that is (part of) what 
makes the language meaningful, then perhaps one would think that to create a meaningless language, 
one which is simply gibberish, would be to give it no identifiable vocabulary, grammar, or phonology, 
and provide no rules for it to follow. Such a task would be, it seems, quite easy since it requires a 
complete lack of sophistication, and provides a complete freedom. On a truth-conditional theory of 
meaning, it is even easier to create a meaningless language: One simply needs to ensure that there are 
no truth conditions for any sentence. It is interesting, then, to consider languages which were 
specifically designed to be nonsense languages or not to have any meaning. We show that it is not as 
easy to create a meaningless language as one might think. 
 People have a remarkable tendency to find meaning and patterns where in fact none exists. This 
tendency — called pareidolia — to find significant or significative patterns in what is in fact vague or 
random stimulus is often exemplified visually, for example, seeing animals in clouds, a face on Mars, 
or Jesus on a piece of toast, and it is argued that the ability that humans have from a very early age of 
distinguishing faces from non-faces is an evolutionarily beneficial survival technique [17, 24]. But this 
tendency is not restricted to the visual; humans have also shown a remarkable ability to impute sense to 
 supposedly nonsensical auditory stimulus. When presented with a language which is intended to be 
meaningless, people are remarkably good at imposing meaning onto the gibberish. We give two 
examples of this phenomenon.  The first is a short sketch entitled “Skwerl” [7]. The sketch lasts about 
three and a half minutes and opens with domestic scenes in a kitchen, of a meal being prepared. The 
scene then shifts to another room with the entrance of a second person, and a dialogue between a man 
and a woman, clearly a couple, who speak to each other while eating. The dialogue begins pleasant at 
first, but then devolves into an argument, resulting in the woman storming out of the room, to return 
bearing a birthday cake and crying. In the dialogue, there are isolated phrases which are identifiable — 
at one point the woman says “I mean”, at another, the man says “Yeah, sure” and a bit later “a long 
way”, and the dialogue breaks off with a clearly distinguishable expletive — but the majority of the 
dialogue is gibberish to the hearer. Inspection of the screenplay itself
13
 shows that many of the words 
— perhaps upwards of 75% — are identical with ordinary English words, including pronouns, 
indexicals, question words, prepositions, fillers such as ‘oh’, ‘okay’, ‘so’, and nouns such as gate’, 
‘frown’, and verbs such as ‘chase’, ‘can’, ‘raise’. These words are, for the most part, used according to 
their syntactic categories; that is, pronouns are used as pronouns, question words as question words, 
etc. It is even possible to determine the semantic categories of some of the nonsense words; ‘gring’ is a 
noun, as are ‘chosik’ and ‘pribadium’. Nevertheless, it is difficult to determine the grammatical 
structure of many of the sentences. 
 In an interview, the authors of the sketch explain how they came up with the speech: “We sort of 
had these sentences and then kind of garbled them and kind of wrote down. . . the garble as it came 
                                                 
13  Our thanks to Eccleston and Fairbairn for sending us a copy. 
out” [11]. Thus, in the creation of this language there was no attempt at systematicity, rule-following, or 
any other constrained type of behavior. In the same interview, the question of sense or meaning was 
posed: 
 
Stephen Fry: Did you imagine that there was sense behind it? He thinks she’s forgotten his 
birthday, is that what... 
 
Karl Eccleston: That’s one interpretation. I’m not an actor but Fiona in the film is an actress so 
she needed to know what this was about, she needed the intentions, but I think it was important 
to kind of have sort of a sense behind what we were saying [11]. 
 
Nevertheless, after watching the sketch, one comes away with a strong feeling of knowing what just 
occurred; we can construct a story of what went on in the dialogue as a result of the couple’s behavior, 
their tones of voice, inflection, etc., as well as from other contextual cues such as the birthday cake and 
candles.
14
 Popular media accounts of the sketch comment on this phenomenon; for example, 
Huffington Post journalist Rao says “The couple in ‘Skwerl’ speak a combination of mixed-up English 
and nonsense words, but their meaning is eminently clear ” [23] (emphasis added). Of course, Rao is 
not speaking as a philosopher, but rather reporting on ordinary, every day experiences, but this 
phenomenological side of things should not be discounted. If part of our argument for why we should 
accord Quenya, Sindarin, etc., the status of meaningful languages is because of the way we use and 
interact with them, that is, because we act as if they are meaningful, then we need to apply a similar 
standard to the supposedly nonsense language. If people watch this sketch and come away from it with 
a general agreement about what just happened, even if they disagree on the particulars, then by a 
principle of parity we should also be prepared to accord this gibberish the status of meaningful, too. 
 This same phenomenon, of attributing meaning to something that was intended to be 
meaningless, can also be found in the so-called Minionese, the Minion language spoken by the little 
yellow characters in the movies “Despicable Me” (2010) and “Despicable Me 2” (2013). In the 
production notes for the latter, director Chris Renaud says of this language: 
 
Their language sounds silly, but when you believe that they’re actually communicating that’s 
what makes it funnier. What’s great about the Minion language, while it is gibberish, it sounds 
real [22, p. 15]. 
 
Minionese was not intended to have any grammatical structure, but merely be random words that 
nevertheless still appeared to convey content and be meaningful, and somehow it has succeeded.
15
 One 
reason for its success is that Minionese sounds real, because individual words or sounds from different 
languages such as Spanish, Italian, and French were used. For example, we can pick out single words 
such as ‘gelato’ as meaning ‘ice cream’, from a scene where the minions run towards an ice cream van 
shouting ‘gelato!’. In another scene, the minions see a banana and kept saying ‘banana’ in a funny 
accent; from this, we can determine that ‘banana’-in-a-funny-accent means the normal banana that we 
know in daily life. Because the phonetics and some of the vocabulary are familiar to us, we recognize 
Minionese as some form of communication, and because we recognize some of the words as familiar, 
there is a strong impetus to try to attribute meaning to the other parts of the language.  The question 
                                                 
14  This sort of phenomenon can occur in any context where the participants are speaking a 
language the observer doesn’t known, whether that language is made-up or not.  This shows that the 
problems raised here for the truth-conditional account arise not merely from consideration of fictional 
languages. Thanks to one of the referees for raising this point. 
15  In this respect, then, it isn’t really ‘gibberish’, which contains no meaning whatsoever. 
also arises here of what it means for the language to have been intended to be meaningless: 
Meaningless for whom?  Certainly the Minions do not find the language meaningless, since they 
successfully communicate to each other.  This successful communication is part of what drives our 
desire to attribute meaning to the language, even if we have been told that it is supposed to be 
meaningless, at least to us. 
 The strength of this force pushing people to create meaning out of something even when they 
know it was intended to be nonsense it witnessed by the developments of English to Minion Language 
dictionaries, such as [2], and the fact that Minion Language has been translated into various languages 
in subtitled versions of the movies, and these subtitles are not merely the substitution of meaningless 
words for other meaningless words, but are often into grammatical, meaningful English (or other 
language). This fact is particularly indicative: If Minionese were truly meaningless, then it would be 
impossible to translate. The fact that it can be translated means that there is something to translate, and 
there are grounds on which translations can be evaluated as better or worse (cf. the discussion of 
translation in the previous section). 
 Nevertheless, even if we are able to translate some, or even all, of Minionese speech fragments, 
it is clear that it cannot be a real or genuine language because no syntactic structure or grammatical 
rules can be established.  There is thus no rule for the generation of new written or spoken strings 
which will count as genuinely Minionese. Thus, even if we are able to function adequately as a hearer 
of Minionese, in that we can listen to two Minions speaking to each other and come away with some 
understanding of what transpired, we cannot become a Minionese speaker because there is no principle 
by which we can evaluate whether the string we have generated is Minionese or not. But let us set this 
issue aside, and focus on the fact that it is apparently possible to become an adequate hearer. In the next 
section, we explore further how this can be, and why a truth-conditional theory of meaning will not be 
sufficient. 
 
5 Understanding nonsense 
 
How do we manage to understand gibberish conversations? We cannot explain this in terms of syntactic 
theories because there is no, or insufficient, syntactic structure. We cannot give a truth-conditional 
account of the semantics because of the problems of assigning truth-values in fictional discourse 
discussed above.  A truth-conditional account of meaning cannot suffice because underlying this 
approach to semantics there is a requirement that the syntax be robust enough to produce truth-
evaluable content (be it sentences, propositions, or what have you). We argue that in order to explain 
the phenomena discussed in the previous sections, a pragmatic, or use-based, account of meaning must 
be provided, relating the understanding of the language to its being usage- and context-based. 
 Let us give another example. In the trailer for the Despicable Me spin-off “Minions”, coming 
out in summer 2015, three minions, Bob, Stuart, and Kevin, are on a boat. Bob is curled up, rubbing his 
stomach and whimpering; Kevin sees this and says something ending with a raised tone of voice, and 
Bob replies. Stuart joins the conversation, moaning and saying something, then seeing his friends 
becoming two bananas in front of him. He then frantically tries to eat one of the bananas, which was in 
fact Kevin, who looks distressed and then says something, after which the three engage in a fight. All 
three say something during the fight, and eventually Kevin says something loudly and everyone stops.    
The ‘somethings’ here are symbolic units of Minionese. In describing the scene, we remained as neutral 
as possible before trying to decipher the phenomenon of understanding step by step, which goes 
something like this: After acknowledging some alien words, in almost a split second we establish that 
the first something was a question uttered by Kevin asking Bob something along the lines of ‘what is 
the matter’. Bob then replied saying that he was hungry or that he wanted food. Stuart joined in saying 
‘I want food too’ or some such, and then went into a hunger induced hallucination. In response to being 
attacked, Kevin said something along the lines of ‘what are you doing?’, and eventually got fed up and 
shouted ‘timeout’. We cannot be sure exactly what the equivalent English expressions might be16 but 
the scene was easily comprehensible: Many people independently watching this trailer, with no prior 
exposure to the Minions or their language, would explain the scene in a similar fashion. We argue that 
this is only possible through extra-truth-conditional constraints, and, primarily, that it is through 
pragmatic features of conversations. 
 We think that the conversation went a certain way based on our knowledge on normal 
conversation, and thus now we turn to features of normal conversations in languages that we do 
understand. Grice’s account of conversation invoked the so-called Cooperative Principle, which is 
manifest in terms of four types of conversational maxims [14]:
17
 
1. Quantity: One should contribute the right amount of information required in a conversation. 
2. Quality: One should aim to say what is true, not to say what is believed to be not true and 
should not make claims that lacks evidence. 
3. Relation: One should contribute relevant information in a conversation. 
4. Manner: One should shape utterances in such a way that they are brief, well structured and 
avoid ambiguity or obscurity. 
The essence of engaging in a communicative exchange is determining whether the participants are 
being appropriately cooperative. Successful cooperation depends on many factors; to engage in a 
successful communicative exchange, the conversation is dependent on the speaker, the hearer, the 
context of the situation, background knowledge of participants, and the conventional meaning of 
linguistic symbols.  In particular, conventions are closely associated to social groups, communities, 
and, hence, culture. The culture-relativity of conventions plays a significant role in interpreting scenes 
such as the scene from the trailer described above. For example, in some cultures, because of the 
significant correlation between social movements and emotions, there is a strong convention that 
emotions ought to be repressed [13]. If someone from such a cultural setting was watching the Minions 
scene Kevin’s response to Bob’s moaning could have been understood as ‘Can you please stop 
moaning?’ instead of a concerned inquiry. This emphasizes how variation of interpretation is 
interdependent on all aspects concerning the situation and context. 
 Often, Grice’s theory of conversational implicatures is invoked as a secondary step in the 
determination of meaning: That is, first we identify the sentence meaning (or semantic meaning) and 
then recover from this and from features about utterance context, etc., what the speaker’s meaning (or 
pragmatic meaning) must be. But this division of labor only works if there is a well-defined process 
wherein we can determine the first step, that is, the sentence meaning.  No such process exists for 
languages like Minionese: It appears that all of the work goes on at the pragmatic level. We cannot 
explain how we understand exchanges in Minion in terms of first understanding the semantic values of 
the sentences and then interpreting them in the conversational exchange, rather it is much the other way 
around: We take what we know of ordinary conversational exchanges, and use this to understand the 
interplay, and only after that could we attempt to assign individual sentence meanings. 
 One remarkable aspect of ‘interpreting’ nonsense languages is the ease with which we, 
apparently, do it: There is no extra cognitive time or effort that is involved in imputing meaning to the 
couples’ exchange in “Skwerl” or to dialogues between Minions. We now turn to considering this fact, 
how quickly and without difficulty we managed to understand the scenes. The process seems 
                                                 
16  Although, contra, see our comments about subtitling above; at some point, someone had to 
make a decision about what these phrases mean, in order to translate them for the subtitles. 
17  These four are not the only maxims; there are other maxims such as being polite and making 
sure each conversation receives its appropriate closure, etc. However, these are less universal. For 
instance, when two people are quarreling, they do not necessarily have to be polite to be cooperative. 
They may be acting cooperatively simply by keeping up the agonistic nature of the conversation during 
the argument [16]. 
almosteffortless. Truth-conditional accounts of meaning have difficulty accounting for this 
phenomenon; under a use-based theory, language is taken as a complex adaptive system where the 
cognition interacts with usage events, particularly when we are presented with linguistic inputs [15]. 
The adaptive system contains a few main processing abilities [15, p. 2]: 
1. Categorizing involves recognizing certain language tokens as certain types. In the case of 
Minionese, we recognize some form of linguistic tokens which is beyond our scope of 
knowledge. 
2. Chunking is the ability to form sequential units through repetition and practice. Evidence from 
child language acquisition confirms that when an individual frequently encounters certain items 
of input which have a role in a use-based process, there is a better chance for those input to 
beentrenched. Entrenchment simply means that certain linguistic routines, such as how certain 
words are grouped, become established firmly in the cognition in a way that is difficult to 
reverse. Input items can become entrenched through repeatedly encountering certain formation 
of sentences and frequent successful usage in context. Therefore, it is possible to be trained to 
improve language skills. 
3. Rich memory is the ability to store detailed information from experience. For instance, a non-
native speaker of English may not immediately recognize that “I’d be more than happy to join 
the meal if you like” can convey a reluctance to join the group if context made it sound like “I 
am only going because I want to be seen as a committed friend instead of because I enjoy the 
company of my friends”. But after some situations where this leads to misunderstanding, the 
speaker will learn to bear this in mind, not make that mistake in the future. 
4. Analogy is the feature which allows us to expand the initial information we have stored in our 
heads. We are considerably capable of expanding our understanding of the structure and 
meaning of language based on prototypical stimuli. Understanding analogies is what makes it 
possible for us to make sense of metaphors. For example, saying that I am going to ‘drop him a 
line’ does not mean I am going to physically perform an action that would result in the dropping 
of a line [20, p. 209], but through analogy, we can make sense of a metaphorical extension that 
‘drop him a line’ means something like leaving someone a written message. 
5. Cross-modal association is the ability of linking form and meaning, where here meaning is 
taken as “the sum total of how the form is used in a communicative context” [15, p. 10]. This is 
the ability to relate and map two structurally different stimuli. 
Use-based theories rely heavily on learning generalizations through experience and accumulating 
knowledge about language through active use. The key concept is that our brains possess these abilities 
that allow us to engage in linguistic activities, and the system works interdependently like a complex 
web of network, committed to process language. Such a view is consistent with a modular view of 
cognition, where the focus is in “function-specific cognitive mechanisms” [1]. Arguably, if each 
module is responsible for a domain-specific function, then the process can be deemed incomplete if any 
of the above abilities fail to work. For instance, autism is sometimes associated with so-called 
semantic-pragmatic disorder [3]. Autistic people may have considerably excellent cognitive potential in 
memory, normal use of grammar and phonology, however, they may also show considerable inabilities 
in comprehension within conversational context and abnormal use of expressions. They have no 
problem in using language to express what they want; however, they face difficulties in reading beyond 
the literal meanings of words in specific situations. It can be seen that they have no difficulties in 
categorizing, chunking, and memorizing but they show inabilities in analogy and cross-modal 
association. 
 This leads us to our final consideration: How did we come to understand the nonsense 
conversation? Let us consider not merely use-based theories of meaning, but use-based theories of 
cognition more generally. Such theories account for how our brain tends to process language-related 
inputs, and can be paired with a theory of pragmatics explaining how we expect a linguistic experience 
of conversation to proceed. In [6], Dornelles and Garcez attempt to explain the phenomenon of 
understanding nonsense with a scenario of a telephone conversation within a fabricated frame. The 
telephone conversation involved three participants, A, B and C. A called B thinking he was ordering 
beer from a beverage company for a party and they engaged in a short conversation.  Then B suddenly 
passed the phone to C, who did not know what was going on. A and C then became active participants 
in the conversation, trying to figure out what is happening. After a slightly prolonged period of 
confused silences and question asking, they found out C was in fact the co-planner of the said  party 
with A. A thought he was phoning the beverage company but he in fact phoned C at his house by 
mistake; B had picked up the phone and played a practical joke on A and C. 
 The main focus of this experiment was on that prolonged period of confusion, when A and C 
were trying to make sense of what they were both dealing with. The confusion was prolonged because 
there appears a so-called one-dimensional frame of interpretation dependent on what we expect. When 
an interactive structure is established, participants will focus on staying in that frame even in the 
presence of strong signals of deception. When the conversation became too incomprehensible in the 
original frame, due to ambiguities or errors, the frame broke or shifted. During the interpretative 
episode, the conversation depended heavily on the basis of the participants’ own view of what is going 
on. If they did not depend on their own views, they would not be reluctant to shift the frame and the 
prolonged period could have been avoided. However, that was not the case.  The key point here relates 
to our function as a spectator or receiver in Minionese exchange. In understanding that gibberish 
dialogue, we depended heavily on what we already know and expect from our own languages and 
cultures; we understood the minions because they shared little gestures, facial expressions, and tone of 
voice that we normally associate with our usual language exchange. However, the more prolonged the 
exchange that we are trying to interpret, the more difficulty we will have, and eventually our frame may 
break. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
The problems posed by fictional discourse for truth-conditional theories of meaning are well known, 
and there is a long history of attempted solutions.  Less well investigated are the problems that fictional 
languages pose. We have considered the case of meaningful fictional languages whose meaningfulness 
is demonstrated through composition, translation, and literary criticism and evaluation. That is, we act 
as if languages like Quenya, Sindarin, and Adûnaic are meaningful, and if this meaningfulness cannot 
be cashed out in terms of truth-conditions, we must find an alternative way of accounting for our 
actions. 
 We also considered the case of languages intended by their creators to be meaningless which 
nevertheless have meaning imposed upon them by people exposed to them. That is, we also act with 
respect to those languages intended to be meaningless as if they are in fact meaningful. Both examples 
demonstrate the difficulty of creating a language that is truly meaningless; people will always seek to 
attribute patterns — that is, meaningfulness — in apparently random data. Sometimes this shift from 
meaninglessness to meaningfulness happens deliberately; for example, the Klingon language of the TV-
series “Star Trek” first appeared as a few sentences of gibberish made up by James Doohan for the first 
movie, but a decision was made, for the third movie, to build those gibberish sentences into a full-
grown language by the development of a grammar for an enlarged lexicon [21].
18
 But both trajectories 
demonstrate the overweening desire of humans to impose meaning onto language-like vocalizations
19
, 
                                                 
18  From then, the language has grown to include at least two dialects [19, p. 272] and a project to 
translate the Bible and Shakespeare into Klingon; see the Klingon Language Institute’s projects, 
http://klv.mrklingon.org/. 
19  This same phenomenon can be seen amongst pet owners who insist that they have identified 
a desire which can be better explained by a use-based theory of meaning rather than a truth-conditional 
account. While it is certainly possible to maintain a truth-conditional account and insist that all of these 
languages are in principle meaningless, then we are faced with the problem of accounting for our 
behavior; if these languages are meaningless, what is it that is guiding our behavior in treating them as 
meaningful? Surely that is what we should turn our attention to and give a philosophical account of 
instead.
20
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